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NOTES
CIVIL FORFEITURE AND THE STATUS
OF INNOCENT OWNERS AFTER BEN1VIS
V. MICHIGAN
You get married based on mutual love and respect. A few years
later, you and your spouse purchase a brand new automobile as joint
tenants. Soon afterwards you hear the shocking news of your spouse's
arrest for picking up a prostitute and performing an indecent act in
the car that you had recently purchased. Your unfaithful spouse gets
convicted of gross indecency, but the nightmare does not end. The
government confiscates the car because it was an instrument used to
create a nuisance. The government, however, does not compensate you
as an innocent owner for your interest in the vehicle. As if the realiza-
tion of your spouse's infidelity is not enough, you are now left without
a car, which you need to drive to work, to go to the doctor or to take
the kids to school. Is this possible in the United States? Yes, said the
United States Supreme Court in Bennis v. Michigan.'
In 1996, in Bennis, the United States Supreme Court upheld as
constitutional a Michigan statute that permits the forfeiture of a mar-
ried couple's jointly owned car due to its use by the husband for an
unlawful act without the wife's acquiescence, knowledge or consent.'
The Court, following a long and unbroken line of cases firmly fixed in
American jurisprudence, held that such a forfeiture does not violate
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The Court held, rather,
that such a forfeiture is consistent with those past decisions in which
the Court held that an owner forfeits any interest in property when
the property is used improperly—even if the owner had no knowledge
of the improper uses The Court also held that such a forfeiture does
not violate the Takings Clause of the Constitution because the govern-
ment does not have to compensate an owner for property acquired
I See 116 S. Ct. 994, 996 (1996).
2 Id,
3 Id. at 998, 1001.
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through a governmental authority other than the power of eminent
domain.'' In so holding, the Supreme Court gave uncontrollable power
to the state and federal governments to confiscate any property put
to an illegal use without performing any inquiry as to the property
owner's conduct.'
This Note examines the Bennis decision and argues that it was
decided wrongly. 6
 By focusing on a tradition that evolved out of neces-
sities not present in Bennis, the Court ignored not only some of its
more recent decisions but also the fundamental notions of fairness
that underlie the Constitution.? Section I provides a background dis-
cussion of civil forfeiture and its historical roots and purpose Section
II examines previous constitutional challenges to forfeiture statutes
and the case law.• Section III discusses the Bennis decision in detail. 1 °
Section IV argues that the Bennis Court reached its decision on the
basis of flawed reasoning."
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL FORFEITURE
LAWS AND THEIR PURPOSE
Where a man killeth another with the sword of John at Stile, the
sword shall forfeit as deodand, and yet no default is in the owner
—Oliver W. Holmes' 2
English law provided three grounds for the forfeiture of a person's
property.' 3
 Originally, early English common law developed a proce-
dure known as deodand, under which the King forfeited any object
causing the death of an English citizen." The King would in turn use
the money derived from the forfeiture for religious or charitable pur-
poses.'" Over time, the original application of deodand for religious or
charitable purposes faded, and it became a source of revenue justified
4
 Id.	 1001.
5 See id. at 1003 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6
 See infra notes 125-304 and accompanying text.
7
 See infra notes 255-304 and accompanying text.
a
 See infra notes 12-32 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 32-124 and accompanying text.
1 " See infra notes 125-254 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 255-304 and accompanying text.
12
 OLIVER W. HOLM[•S, TILE COMMON LAw 25 (1881).
15 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,680-83 (1973).
14 Id. at 681. Deodand derives from the Latin Deo dandum, "to be given to God." Id. at 681
n.16.
15
 See id. at 681.
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as a penalty for negligence.'" At the same time, English common law
provided for forfeiture of the property of someone convicted for felo-
nies and treason." Finally, English law provided for statutory forfei-
tures of offending objects used in violation of the custom and revenue
laws.I 8
Of England's three kinds of forfeiture, only statutory forfeiture
emerged as a ground for forfeiture in the United States.'" Early United
States forfeiture law focused primarily on admiralty law, subjecting to
forfeiture ships and cargoes involved in customs offenses." The gov-
ernment brought in rem proceedings because it often found locating
ship owners difficult. 21 In rem proceedings, in turn, granted courts
proper jurisdiction over the property even if they could not acquire in
personam jurisdiction over the property owner. 22
Contemporary federal and state forfeiture statutes, however, reach
virtually any type of property used in the conduct of a criminal enter-
prise." Approximately one hundred different federal statutes currently
provide for civil forfeiture in a variety of criminal contexts. 24 In par-
ticular, the use of forfeiture has become an increasingly popular means
to combat drug trafficking. 25
As a response to the growing influx of illegal drugs, Congress
adopted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
of 1970. 26 The Act authorized the United States Department ofjustice
to bring civil forfeiture actions against any property used or acquired
in violation of narcotics laws. 27 The Comprehensive Crime Control Act
16 Id.
17 Id. at 682. A breach of criminal law was an offense to the King's peace, which justified tire
denial of the right to own property. Id.
Calerozlidedo, 416 U.S. at 682.
wAttstin v, U.S., 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2807 (1993). Deodands did not become part of the common
law traditions of this country. Id. The Constitution forbids forfeiture of estates as a punishment
for treason, "except during the life of the person attained." U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 3, cl. 2. The
first Congress of the United States also abolished forfeiture of estates as a punishment for felons.
Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 117 (1790); see also Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2807.
24)
 Austin, 1 13 S, Gl. at 2807,
21 See id. at 2808-09 n.9. In rein proceedings are based on the legal fiction that the object—
rather than the owner of the property—serves as the offending party or the "defendant." See The
Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) I, 14-15 (1827),
22 Austin, 113 S. Gt. at 2808-09 n.9.
211 Calero-Toledo, 916 U.S. at 683.
24 See Faddy Lynette, How Much Is Tim Much? Civil Forfritures and the Excessive Fines Clause
After Austin v. United StaleS, 95 FLA. L. REV. 709, 713 (1993).
25 Damon G. Saluburg, Real Property Forfeitures As a Weapon in the Government's War on
Drugs: A Failure to Protect Innocent Ownership Rights, 72 R.U. L. REv. 217, 217 (1992).
26 Id.
27 Id. In 1978 Congress expanded civil forfeiture law to reach proceeds derived from drug
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of 1984 further amended the forfeiture laws, specifically allowing for-
feiture actions against real property purchased with drug proceeds or
intended for use in narcotics trafficking. 28
 As a result, the government
has dramatically increased the use of civil forfeitures in recent years. 29
The in rem nature of forfeiture proceedings has made it very easy
for the government to seize property without considering the conduct
of the owner involved." Such ease, however, has increased the potential
for abuse by government officials. 3 ' Although some federal statutes now
provide some protections for innocent owners, many federal and state
statutes still do not. 32
II. IN REM CIVIL FORFEITURE AND THE INNOCENT OWNER
A. The innocence of the owner of property subject to forfeiture
is not a defense to forfeiture
Historically, courts did not consider the innocence of owners
when their property became subject to forfeiture because courts re-
garded the property itself as the evil that the forfeiture statute sought
to remedy. 33 In 1827, in The Palmyra, the United States Supreme Court
held that a ship owner's conviction did not serve as a prerequisite to
the forfeiture of a ship allegedly engaged in violation of a federal
statute.'" The Palmyra was an armed vessel that allegedly attempted a
piratical aggression, search, depredation, restraint and seizure on the
high seas upon a United States vessel." The defendant argued that the
Court could not hear the in rem forfeiture suit prior to the conviction
of the alleged offenders in an in personam action. 36
 The Supreme
Court reasoned that because it regarded the property itself as the
transactions, including any assets bought with such proceeds and exchanged, or intended to be
exchanged, for controlled substances. Id. at 217-18.
28
 Id. at 218.
29 See. Mary M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick, and Profitable Also Be Fair? Runaway
Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. Scut. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1994). The Federal
government effected 35,295 seizures of property in 1991, reflecting 18 increases since 1986. Id.
According to figures provided by the Justice Department's Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture,
net deposits in the Asset Forfeiture Fund grew from $93.7 million in 1986 to $643.6 million. $531
million and $555.7 million in 199], 1992 and 1993, respectively. Id.
3" See id. at 2-3.
31 See id. at 7.
32
 See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5317 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994); Multi. Cow. Laws ANN.
§ 600.3801 (West 1987 Sc Stipp. 1995).
33 See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-15 (1827).
34 Id. at 12, 15.
35 M. at 1.
36 Id. at 12.
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offender in an in rem proceeding, the conviction of the owner of the
property in a criminal proceeding had no bearing on the forfeiture of
the property.37 The Court thus enforced the forfeiture of The Palmyra
without inquiring whether the owners were guilty of any crime. 88
In 1844, in United States v. Cargo of the Brig Malek Adhel, the United
States Supreme Court held that the statutory forfeiture of a vessel
remained valid despite the innocence of the owner. 39 Although the
lower court convicted the possessors of the vessel of piracy, it also
established the innocence of the owners of the vessels.'" Applying the
Palmyra rationale, the Court treated the vessel as the offender, without
regard to the owners' conduct.'' The Court reasoned that this was the
only adequate means of "suppressing the offense or wrong, or insuring
an indemnity to the injured party."42 Despite the owners' innocence,
therefore, the Brig Malek Court held that the forfeiture of the vessel
was proper because it was used in an unlawful activity. 43
In 1877, in Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court again allowed the forfeiture of property despite the
owner's assertion of innocence as a defense. 44 The case involved a
lessee, operator and occupant of a distillery who made false entries in
his record books in violation of revenue laws and kept them in the
distillery. 45 Subsequently, the government seized all real and personal
property used in connection with the distillery. 4" The owner of the
property sought to contest the forfeiture by maintaining that he had
no knowledge that the lessee had committed a fraud on the public
revenue." The Court reasoned that by permitting another to use his
land as a distillery, the law placed the owner on the same footing as if
he were the distiller.'" The Court therefore determined the owner's
conduct of no consequence because the offense attached primarily to
the distillery and the real and personal property used in connection
37 See id. at 14-15.
The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 15.
3° See United States v. Cargo of the Brig Malek Adhel., 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233-34, 237
(1844),
4° See id. at 230.
41 Id. at 234.
42 Id. at 233.
43 Id. at 234, 237.
44 See Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 396, 404 (1877).
43 Id. at :396.
46 Id. at 397.
47 Id,
43 See id. at 399.
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with the distillery. 49
 The Supreme Court thus upheld the forfeiture of
property used by a lessee in violation of federal revenue laws without
considering the lessor's conduct.i'
In the early twentieth century, the Court addressed the issue of
whether the application of a forfeiture statute to innocent owners
survived constitutional scrutiny.'' In 1921, in J. W. Goldsmith, Jr. - Grant
Co. v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that the
federal tax-fraud forfeiture statute did not violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 52
 The case involved the forfeiture of
a taxicab used to transport alcohol in violation of federal law." The
owner of the taxicab, a dealer in cars who retained title while financing
the purchase, had no knowledge, notice or reason to suspect that the
purchasers would use the car illegally. 54 The Goldsmith Court ultimately
rejected arguments that the application of the statute to cover an
innocent owner was unconstitutional, although it did acknowledge that
the arguments had some validity. 55
The Goldsmith Court analogized the federal tax-fraud statute to
the law of deodand that provided for the forfeiture of a chattel causing
a person's immediate death. 56
 The Court reasoned that the assumption
underlying the law of deodand was that the misfortune resulted from
the owner's negligence; therefore punishment of the owner was appro-
priate.`'' The Goldsmith Court noted that whether this reason for for-
feiture was artificial or real, forfeiture had become too firmly fixed in
the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country for the Court
to replace it. 58
 The Court reserved its opinion as to whether the statute
could extend to property stolen from the owner or otherwise taken
without the owner's privity.59 The Goldsmith Court, therefore, con-
cluded that a tax-fraud statute did not violate the Constitution by
forfeiting property of an innocent owner. 6°
In 1926, in Van Oster v. Kansas, the United States Supreme Court
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did
49 Dobbin's, 96 U.S. at 401.
5° See id. at 396, 404.
51
 Seej.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1921).
52 See id, at 508, 510, 513.
53 See id. at 508, 509.
54 Id. al 508, 509.
55
 Id. al 510.
56 Goldsmith, 254 U.S. at 510.
57 See Id. at 511.
58 Id.
59 See id. at 512.
t'"t See id. at 508, 510, 513.
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not limit the state's power to forfeit property of an innocent owner
who entrusted its possession and use to a wrongdoer. 6 ' In Win Oster,
the plaintiff purchased an automobile from a local dealer and, as
partial consideration, had agreed to allow an associate of the local
dealer to use the automobile for business. 62 The State of Kansas later
arrested the associate for using the plaintiff's automobile to transport
liquor and sought to forfeit the automobile as a common nuisance
under a Kansas statute!'" The plaintiff claimed that the transportation
of the liquor had taken place without her knowledge or authority and
that the statute denied her due process of law as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment."
The Van Oster Court reasoned that it did not need to consider the
innocence or guilt of the owner because state legislatures, in the
exercise of their police power, remained free to determine that certain
uses of property were undesirable and to take strong preventive meas-
ures against such uses. 65 The Court, citing Goldsmith and Dobbins, noted
that statutory forfeiture of property entrusted by an innocent owner
to another who used it in violation of the revenue laws of the United
States did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.""
The Van Oster Court determined no valid reason to distinguish be-
tween the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the exercise
of the state's police power in this case and the application of the Fifth
Amendment to the similar exercise of the federal government's taxing
power. 1i 7 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that forfeiting property
involved in illegal liquor transfers under Kansas law satisfied the dic-
tates of the Fourteenth Amendment."
In sum, through 1926 the United States Supreme Court almost
uniformly rejected the innocence of the owner as a valid defense to
such a forfeiture'" This trend illustrated the Court's willingness to
carry out legislative intent by rejecting an innocent owner defense
where the statute did not provide for it. 7" Moreover, it emphasized the
existence of judicial skepticism towards the claims of innocence by
61 See Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465,467-68 (1926).
62 Id, at 465-66.
uki. at 466•
64 See id. at 466-67,
6 Id. at 467.
66 Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 468.
67 Id.
"8 Id. at 466-68.
66 Calera-Toletto, 4 16 U.S, at 683.
7" George T. Pappas, Civil Farfritare and Drug Proceeds: The Need to Balance Societal Interests
with the Rights of Innocent Owners, 77 MARQ. L. Rt.N. 856863 (1994).
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property owners. 71
 The Court's underlying purpose for rejecting inno-
cent owner claims was to encourage property owners to exercise
greater care with their property and thus reduce any risk of collusion."
B. Change in the Court's Attitude and Constitutional Limits to In Rem
Forfeiture Statutes Before Bennis v. Michigan
In 1974, faced again with the constitutionality of a broad forfeiture
statute, in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., the United States
Supreme Court held that a Puerto Rican forfeiture statute was consti-
tutional as applied to an innocent lessor." The Court reasoned that
even if a statutory scheme affords no defense to innocents, it nonethe-
less remains constitutional in light of both the historical background
of forfeiture statutes in the United States and the Court's prior deci-
sions sustaining the constitutionality of such statutes. 74
 The Supreme
Court suggested in dicta, however, that some constitutional limits do
exist with respect to the government's power to forfeit property.'"
In Calero-Toledo, the police found marijuana aboard a yacht leased
from its owners, a yacht company." Although the owners had no
involvement in or knowledge of the lessee's wrongful use of the boat,
the government forfeited their vessel." The Calero-Toledo Court re-
jected the yacht company's argument that the forfeiture violated the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.'"
The Court found that the Puerto Rican forfeiture statute fur-
thered punitive and deterrent purposes." Such purposes, the Court
reasoned, were sufficient to uphold the application of forfeiture stat-
utes to the property of innocents against constitutional challenge.80
The Calero-Toledo Court reasoned that the statute served the purpose
of preventing illegal uses by imposing an economic penalty on the
owner, thus rendering the illegal behavior unprofitable. 81
 The Court
71
 Michael Goldsmith & Mark J. Linderman, Asset Forfeiture and Third Party Rights: The Need
for Further Law Reform, 1989 DUKE U. 1254, 1271 ("A survey of the cases reveals that claimants
were not as innocent as they maintained. Indeed, they often were 'strawmen' holding tide on
behalf of a drug dealer.").
72 See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2808-09 (1993); Goldsmith, 254 U.S. at 511.
73
 416 U.S. 663, 680 (1974).
74 Id.
75 Id, at 689.
76 Id. at 665.
77 Id. at 668.
78 Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680.
79 Id, at 686.
8°
 See id. at 688-89.
81 /d. at 687.
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further indicated that, to the extent that such forfeiture provisions
apply to innocent "lessors, bailors or secured creditors," confiscation
might have the desirable effect of inducing these owners to exercise
greater care in transferring possession of their property."
In sustaining the constitutionality of the Puerto Rican statute, the
Calero-Toledo Court noted the potential difficulty of rejecting a consti-
tutional challenge of the application of a forfeiture statute to an owner
whose property had been taken without his or her privity or consent."'
Similarly, the Court indicated the potential difficulty of rejecting the
constitutional claim of an owner who proved not only a lack of involve-
ment in or awareness of the wrongful activity, but also that he or she
had made every reasonable effort to prevent the proscribed use of his
or her property." In those circumstances, the Calera-Toledo Court rea-
soned, the Court would find it difficult to conclude that the forfeiture
served a legitimate purpose and was not unduly oppressive. 86 The
Supreme Court concluded, however, that the owner in this case had
voluntarily entrusted the lessee with possession of the yacht and had
made no allegation or proof that the yacht company did all that it
could have reasonably done to prevent the unlawful use of its prop-
erty.86 The Galero-Toledo Court thus upheld the constitutionality of a
Puerto Rican forfeiture statute as it applied to an innocent lessor. 87
In 1993, in Austin v. United States, the United States Supreme
Court held that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause ap-
plies to in rem civil forfeiture proceedings. 88 In that case, Austin
pleaded guilty to one count of possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute. 8" Consequently, the prosecution filed an in rem proceed-
ing in the United States District Court of South Dakota seeking forfei-
ture of Austin's mobile home and auto body shop under 21 U.S.C.
§§ MI (a) (4) and (a) (7). 9° According to the government, Austin had
brought two ounces of cocaine from his mobile home to the body shop
to consummate a prearranged sale." The defendant challenged the
proceeding, asserting that the forfeiture violated the Excessive Fines
82 Id. at 688.
83 Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689.
84 id .
85 Id. at 690.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 680.
88 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2803 (1993) ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted," (quoting U.S. Comil'. amend. V111)).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
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Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 92 The Supreme Court first noted
that previous case law recognized that statutory in rem forfeitures
imposed punishment." The Austin Court went on to note that the
understanding that forfeiture is partly punitive runs through those
cases rejecting innocent ownership as a defense.94 According to the
Court, the guilty-property fiction of in rem proceedings rested on the
notion that the owner who allowed the property to become involved
in an offense has been negligent and is properly punished for it. 95 The
Court noted that it had never applied the guilty-property fiction to
justify forfeiture where the owner had done all that reasonably could
be expected to prevent the unlawful use of the property. 9'" The Court
reserved the question of whether the forfeiture of a truly innocent
owner's property would comport with due process because the forfei-
ture provision at issue in Austin exempted "innocent owners. 197 The
Supreme Court held that the forfeiture statute at issue in Austin served
in part as punishment and therefore became subject to the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment." The Court remanded the
case to the lower courts to determine whether the forfeiture, as applied
to Austin, was constitutionally excessive. 99
In sum, in dicta, the Calera-Toledo Court provided for the possibil-
ity of some limitations to civil forfeiture." In addition, the Supreme
Court in Austin made civil forfeiture statutes subject to the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Constitution.m The most significant aspect of the
Austin decision, however, involved the Court's apparent willingness to
move away from the strict historical in rem doctrine by adding that
the owner's negligence was an underlying assumption to in rem for-
feitures.m
Id. at 2804. The Excessive Fines Clause limits the Government's power to extract payments,
whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense. Id. at 2805.
" Austin, 113 S. Ct at 2808.
94 Id.
`-'5 Id. in 2808-2809.
9" Id. at 2809.
37 I& at 2809 n.10.
98 A ustin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
99 /d.
tat See Calero-Totedo, 416 U.S. at 689.
'° Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803.
101 See id. at 2808-09.
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C. Application of the Constitutional Limits to Civil Forfeiture
as Set Forth in Calero-Toledo
Pit would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an
owner whose property subjected to forfeiture has been taken
from him without his privity or consent. . . Similarly, the
same might be said of an owner who proved not only that he
was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but
also that he had done all that he could be expected to prevent
the proscribed use of his property; for, in that circumstance,
it would be difficult to conclude that the forfeiture served
legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive."
The Supreme Court's dicta in Calero- Toledo set forth a three
pronged test to determine whether a property's forfeiture is constitu-
tional in a particular case." The Calera- Toledo Court indicated that the
Constitution would prevent the forfeiture of property owned by a
person who (i) had no involvement in the wrongful conduct; (ii) had
no knowledge of it; and (iii) had done all that reasonably could be
expected to prevent the proscribed use of the property.' 05
Courts have construed state and federal statutes that do not con-
tain innocent owner provisions in light of the three limitations set forth
in Calero- Toledo.“"' Generally, courts have imposed stringent standards
to determine whether an owner took all the reasonable steps outlined
in Calera-Toledo to prevent illegal use of the property. 107 Many cases have
led to harsh results, partly due to judicial skepticism regarding third
party claims of innocence.' 08
I" CalerazIbledo, 410 U.S. at 089-90.
See id.
1 ".5
106 See, e.g., United States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 E2d 870, 879 (2d (Jr. 1990), rill. denied,
498 U.S. 1109 (1991); Therkeld v. State, 586 So. 2d 756, 759 (Miss. 1991) (construing state
forfeiture statute to avoid violation of state C011stitolion's due p14m:oss guarantee); State v. 1979
Pontiac Trans Am, 487 A.2d 722, 726-27 (NJ, 1985) (construing state forfeiture statute to avoid
violation of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).
1"7 See, e.g., United States v. One Mercedes Benz, 604 F. Stipp. 1307, 1317 (S.D.N,Y. 1984)
(out-of-town owner who had lefl his Mercedes in care of acquaintance did not satisfy the all
reasonable test because garaging car would have been a more reasonable means of preventing
its illegal use), riffd, 762 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1985).
-°'Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 71, at 803.
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In contrast, a few courts have tried to avoid the harsh results of
forfeiture by applying the Calero- Toledo test more liberally." For exam-
ple, in 1979, in United States v. One 1976 Lincoln
-Mark iv, the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held that
a forfeiture statute could not constitutionally provide for the forfeiture
of an innocent car owner's vehicle."° The car owner had loaned the
car to his brother-in-law." The owner knew that his brother-in-law had
been involved in a securities violation but was unaware of his involve-
ment with drugs." 2
 The government forfeited his car because the
brother-in-law used the car in connection with a drug transaction."'
The court held that the owner had done all that could be reasonably
expected of him to prevent the illegal use of the vehicle." 4 The court,
citing reputable authority, did acknowledge, however, that the case was
close in that it could have reached an opposite conclusion."' Never-
theless, the court reasoned that a truly affirmative duty to protect one's
property from illegal use would only be triggered by knowledge or
suspicion of potential wrongdoing."' Because the owner had no reason
to suspect his brother-in-law's involvement with drugs, the Lincoln
Mark IV court held that the owner had acted reasonably under the
circumstances and thus refused to allow a government forfeiture of
the car. 117
In 1984, in United States v. One Mercedes
-Benz, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York criticized the
Lincoln Mark IV decision as outside the mainstream authority, holding
that the owner of the vehicle at issue did not do all that reasonably
could be expected in order to prevent illegal use of the vehicle."" The
owner in One Mercedes-Benz left his Mercedes in the care of a parolee
who frequented social clubs where consumption of narcotics was part
of the lifestyle."° The court held that the claimant bore the burden of
proof in demonstrating that he was entirely innocent of the underlying
crime and did all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the
109 See, e.g., United States v. One 1976 Lincoln-Mark IV, 462 F. Supp. 1383, 1392 (W.1), Pa.
I979).
141 Id. at 1391-92.
Id. at 1385-86.
"2 Id.
" 0 1d.
114
 Lincoln
-Mark IV, 462 F. Stipp. at 1391.
115 /d. at 1392.
115 1d. at 1391.
" 7 1d. at 1392.
"8 604 F. Supp. 1307, 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
,11t) Id. at 1317.
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proscribed use of the property.' 2" In this respect the court reasoned
that, although the owner had demonstrated his innocence, he had
failed to prove the second prong of the test, which required him to
take some affirmative action.' 21 The court acknowledged the posses-
sor's apparent rehabilitation from his prior conviction and asserted
that no evidence existed that either the owner or the possessor of the
car themselves used drugs. 122 The Mercedes-Benz court reasoned, how-
ever, that under the circumstances, it would have been more reason-
able for the owner to place the car in a garage to avoid possible
unlawful use or at least to exercise maximum efforts to see that no one
else used the car. 123 The Mercedes-Benz court thus held that the forfei-
ture of the innocent owner's car did not violate the Due Process Clause
because the owner failed to demonstrate that he had taken sufficient
action to prevent the illegal use of his car.' 24
III. BENNIS V. MICHIGAN
In 1996, in Bennis v. Michigan, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a Michigan nuisance abatement statute
that provided for the forfeiture of property where a co-owner had no
knowledge that her husband used the vehicle illegally.' 25 The Court
held that such a forfeiture does not violate the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution under a long and unbroken line of cases, firmly fixed
in American jurisprudence, which hold that an owner forfeits any
interest in property when the property is used improperly even if the
owner had no knowledge of the improper use.' 2" The Court also held
that such a forfeiture does not violate the Takings Clause of the Con-
stitution because the government does not have to compensate an
owner for property acquired through a governmental authority other
than the power of eminent domain.' 27
Detroit police arrested John Bennis after observing him engaged
in a sexual act with a prostitute in an automobile parked on a Detroit
city street. 125 A court later convicted John Bennis of gross indecency in
1201d.
121 Id.
122 id .
123 See One Met-cedes-Benz, 604 F. Stipp. at. 1317.
124 1d. at 1318.
12.5
	
Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Gt, 994, 996 (1906).
126 1d. at 098, 1001.
to Id. at 1001.
128 Id. at 996.
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violation of a Michigan criminal law. 12" Subsequently, the Wayne
County prosecutor brought an action against the co-owners of the car,
Mr. Bennis and his wife, Tina, alleging that the vehicle constituted a
public nuisance subject to abatement under the Michigan Public Nui-
sance Abatement Statute ("Michigan Statute").'" In her defense, Tina
Bennis claimed that she had no knowledge that her husband ever used
the vehicle in violation of the Michigan Statute.c."
Specifically, the Michigan Statute declares that "any ... vehicle ...
used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution" consti-
tutes "a nuisance."'" It authorizes the state attorney general or a county
prosecuting attorney to bring an abatement action against the owners
of the property alleged to constitute a nuisance.'" In addition, it
provides for the forfeiture of certain property used for the purpose of
creating a nuisance.'" The Michigan Statute explicitly provides that
"proof of knowledge of the existence of the nuisance on the part of
the defendants or any of them is not required." 135
At trial, the Wayne County Circuit Court held that the vehicle was
a nuisance and abated the interests of both John and Tina Bennis. 136
On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court.'" The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the prosecution
had an obligation to demonstrate that the defendant knew of the use
of the vehicle as a nuisance, despite the fact that the Michigan Statute
made it irrelevant whether Tina Bennis knew of her husband's illegal
conduct.' ;s The Court of Appeals also held that a single incident of
lewdness, assignation or prostitution was insufficient to establish a
nuisance.'" Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the prosecution had
failed to demonstrate that an act of lewdness, assignation or prostitu-
tion had occurred because no proof existed that Mr. Bennis's sexual
activity involved the payment of money.""
129 Id.; Mitat. Come. LAws ANN. § 750.3386 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995).
11' Bennis., 116 S. Ct. at 996; Micut. CoNtP.I.Aws ANN. § 600.3801 (West. 1987 & Supp. 1995).
131
 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
11 '4 M tcri. Come. Livws ANN. § 600.3801,
183 /(1. § 600.3805.
§ 600.3825.
1311 1d. § 600.3825(2).
Michigan v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2r1 483, 486 (Mich. 1994).
157 Id
138 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
1 'I9 Stale v. Bennis, 504 NAV.2(1 731, 734 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
1 'VO Id. at 735.
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The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals'
decision and upheld the abatement of the car: 41 The Michigan Su-
preme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals' holding on the
statutory issues and rejected Tina Bennis's claim that the forfeiture of
her interest violated the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the United
States Constitution."' The Michigan Supreme Court first concluded
that Mr. Bennis used the car for an act of "lewdness, assignation, or
prostitution" within the meaning of the abatement statute.' 45 In addi-
tion, the court upheld the abatement of the vehicle because the defen-
dant had entered a neighborhood that was known for prostitution and
used his vehicle to engage in illicit activity, thereby contributing to an
existing nuisance."4 The court further held that the Michigan Statute
by its language did not require knowledge of the illicit act on Tina
Bennis's part.'''`'
The Michigan Supreme Court then addressed the constitutional-
ity of the forfeiture statute as it applied to Tina Bennis: 4° The court
relied on the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Van Oster and Calero-
Toledo to conclude that Tina's claim lacked constitutional conse-
quence.' 47 The Michigan Supreme Court noted that Van Oster had
rejected the innocent owner's Fourteenth Amendment clue process
claim because "the offense of unlawful transportation was commit-
ted by one entrusted by the owner with the possession and use of
the offending vehicle." 148 The Michigan Supreme Court reasoned that
Tina's claim had no constitutional consequence because she explic-
itly or implicitly entrusted Mr. Bennis with the use and possession of
their vehicle."" Moreover, the court noted that the United States Su-
preme Court had indisputably allowed forfeiture of an innocent
owner's property unless evidence existed that the property was stolen
or used without the consent of the owner: 5° Because the vehicle in this
case was neither stolen nor driven without Tina Bennis's consent, the
court permitted the abatement: 51
 The Michigan Supreme Court, thus,
141
 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
' 42 See id.
144 Michigan, 527 N.W.2d at 489.
144 See id. at 491.
145 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
1411 Irt.
147 Id.
148 Michigan, 527 N.W.2(1 at 494 (quoting Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467 (1926)),
149 1d.
150 1d. at 495.
151 Id. at 493.
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held that the Michigan Statute unquestionably passed constitutional
muster.' 52
In a five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court affir-
med the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court and upheld the
constitutionality of the forfeiture.'" The majority opinion, written by
Chief. justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Thomas and Ginsburg, held that the Michigan Statute did not violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.'"
The Court first rejected Tina Bennis's due process claim that she
had a right to contest the forfeiture by showing that she did not know
her husband would use the car to violate the Michigan Statute.'" The
Court asserted that a long and unbroken line of cases held that an
owner's interest in property may be forfeited by reason of its use even
when the owner has no knowledge of such use.'" The Court reasoned
that Tina Bennis's lack of knowledge that her husband would use the
car in an illegal activity did not differentiate her from the various
owners involved in the forfeiture cases beginning with The Palmyra in
1827. 1 " On the basis of these cases, the Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect Tina Bennis's
interest against forfeiture by the government.'"
The Court also rejected Tina Bennis's assertion that the Calero-
Toledo Court established that the Constitution bars the forfeiture of
property when owners prove that they took all the reasonable steps to
prevent the property's illegal use.''9
 The Court dismissed this argument
because it relied on a passage from Calero-Toledo that the Bennis Court
considered "obiter dictum." 16° The Court noted that it should focus on
the holdings of the cases rather than their dicta. 16 ' Tina Bennis, accord-
ing to the Court, had not made any showing stronger than that made
by the yacht owner in Calero
- Toledo where the Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the forfeiture despite the owner's lack of knowledge of
the illegal activity.'" The Bennis Court, thus, concluded that the forfei-
152 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
155 Id. at 996, 997-98.
154 1d. at 996.
155
 Id. at 998.
156 Id.
157 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999.
Id
1511 Id.
16" Id.
161 Id.
162 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999.
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ture of Tina Bennis's interest was constitutional under the Calero-Toledo
holding.'"
The Court rejected the dissent's distinction that Supreme Court
cases have treated contraband differently from instrumentalities used
to convey contraband, like cars.' 64 According to the majority, the dis-
sent reasoned that although the objects in the former class are forfeit-
able "however blameless or unknowing the owners may be," in the
latter class, an owner's innocence is not a defense only when the
instrumentalities' principal use is an illegal one.' 65
 The Court stated
that its precedent never hinged the due process inquiry on whether
the use for which the instrumentality was forfeited was the property's
principal use.'" Furthermore, the Court reasoned that such a distinc-
tion, if it existed, might have produced a different result in cases like
Calera-Toledo where there was no showing that the yacht's principal use
was to smuggle drugs.' 67 Moreover, the Bennis Court rejected the sug-
gestion by the dissent that the line of cases following The Palmyra, as
interpreted by the majority, would justify the confiscation of an ocean
liner just because one of its passengers sinned while on board.' When
such an application is made, the Court stated, it "'would be time
enough to pronounce upon it.'' 169
The Court also rejected Tina Bennis's argument that the Court
should import a culpability requirement to forfeiture.'" The Court
noted that the argument, which would in effect overrule well-estab-
lished authority rejecting the innocent owner defense, relied on cases
having at best a tangential relation to the "innocent owner" doctrine
in the forfeiture context.'" Tina Bennis had argued that the holding
in Austin would be difficult to reconcile with any rule that allows
punishment of innocent parties. 172 The Court indicated that Austin
held that forfeiture serves at least in part to punish the owner, but that
165 See id.
164 „rd.
65 Id.
11'6 Id.
I07 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000. The Court noted That only one marijuana cigarette was 'Mulct
on the yacht. Id.
168 m.
169 /d. (quoting Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 512 (1921)).
170 Id.
171 Id. Tina Bennis's argument was based in part on the proposition that the government
may not punish a criminal defendant for a crime if he or she is found to be not guilty. Id. (citing
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 7l (1992)). The Bennis Court held that, putting aside the extent
to which a forfeiture proceeding is punishment in the First place, Foucha did not purport to
discuss, let alone overrule, the line of cases following The Palmyra, Id.
172 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
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it did not address the validity of the "innocent owner defense."'" The
Bennis Court noted that Austin merely pointed out that an innocent
owner defense provision in a statute provides additional evidence that
the statute itself is punitive in motive." 4
 The Court reasoned that the
forfeiture proceeding as provided by the Michigan Statute, however,
was an equitable action in which the trial judge had discretion to
consider alternatives to abating the entire interest in the vehicle.'"
In any event, the Bennis Court stated that forfeiture served a
deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive purpose.'" The Court
reasoned that the forfeiture prevents further illicit use of the property
by imposing an economic penalty that renders the illegal behavior
unprofitable.'" The Court explained that this deterrent mechanism is
not unique to forfeiture and analogized it to tort law in that it would
make the petitioner potentially liable for her husband's use of the car
in violation of Michigan negligence law. 178
 The Court concluded that
the law provided a secondary defense against an illegal use and pre-
cluded the possibility of evasion by dispensing with the necessity of
judicial inquiry as to collusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged
innocent owner.' 7°
The Court next held that the forfeiture was not a taking of private
property for public use in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.'" The Court reasoned that because the forfeiture proceeding
did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, the prop-
erty was properly transferred to the State. 181 The Bennis Court reasoned
that the Constitution does not require the government to compensate
for property that it has already acquired under the exercise of govern-
mental authority other than eminent domain.' 82
Finally, the Court rejected Tina Bennis's argument that the Michi-
gan Statute was unfair in that it relieved prosecutors from the burden
of separating innocent co-owners from those who are partners in the
wrongful use of' property.'" The Court acknowledged that the argu-
L73 Id
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id,
177 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
178 See id.
179 Id. (citing Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467-68 (1926)).
18(' Id. at 1001.
181 Id.
1112 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001.
183 Id.
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ment had considerable appeal in the abstract's' The Court indicated
that the argument, however, loses its force because of the trial court's
remedial discretion and Michigan's power to forfeit the jointly owned
car whether or not Tina remained entitled to compensation for her
interest in the vehicle.' 85 The Bennis Court thus affirmed the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Michigan, holding that the Michigan Statute
did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
or the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 188
 In conclusion, the
Court stated that the cases authorizing actions of the kind at issue were
too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the
country for the Court to replace them.' 87
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, wrote that this case
served as an ultimate reminder that the federal Constitution does not
protect its citizens from everything that is intensely undesirable.' 88
Justice Thomas noted that, historically, courts have permitted the for-
feiture of property used in a crime without proof of the owner's
wrongdoing.' 89
 According to Justice Thomas, the sole restrictions on
the state's ability to take property from those it merely suspects, or does
not even suspect, of colluding in crime involves asking whether the
property was used in, or was an instrumentality of, a crime.'" Even
though these limitations are not clear, Justice Thomas reasoned that
courts should apply them strictly by adhering to historical standards
when constitutional challenges arise.' 91
 Justice Thomas went on to
reason that the facts in this case were not distinguishable from Van
Oster.' 92
 He also noted that Tina Bennis had not asserted that the car
was not an instrumentality of the crime.'"
Justice Thomas acknowledged that improperly used forfeiture
laws could become a roulette wheel—employed to raise revenue from
innocent, but hapless owners whose property is unforseeably mis-
used—or a tool, wielded to punish those who associate with criminals,
rather than a component of a system of justice.'" Nevertheless, Justice
Thomas concluded that when the property forfeited has been en-
184
 Id.
[85 a
188 Id. at 996, 1001.
187 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at MM.
188 Id. (Thomas, J„ concurring).
189 Id. at 1002 (Thomas, J., concurring).
1941 1d. (Thomas, J., concurring).
II" Id. (Thtnnas, J„ concurring).
192 Ben niS, 116 S. Ct. at 1002 (Thomas, J„ concurring).
109 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring),
194 Id. at 1003 (Thomas, J., concurring),
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trusted by its owner to one who uses it for a crime, the Constitution
apparently assigns to the States and to the political branches of the
Federal government the primary responsibility for avoiding an unde-
sirable result: 95
In another concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg highlighted the
features key to her finding against Tina Bennis: 96 First, Justice
Ginsburg noted that John Bennis always had Tina Bennis's consent to
use the car because the car belonged to both of them: 97 Second, Justice
Ginsburg noted that the Michigan Statute's equitable nature was criti-
cal to the judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court: 98
 To accuse the
Michigan Supreme Court of inequitable administration of an "equita-
ble action," Justice Ginsburg reasoned, shows no respect: 99 Justice
Ginsburg noted, moreover, that two practical reasons existed for the
trial judge's decision not to order a division of sale proceeds: the
Bennis family had another automobile and the age and value of the
forfeited car (an eleven-year-old Pontiac purchased for $600) left prac-
tically nothing to divide after subtraction of the costs.'" According to
Justice Ginsburg, therefore, Michigan's decision to deter people like
John Bennis from using cars they own (or co-own) to contribute to
neighborhood blight, and the abatement endeavor, hardly warranted
the Court's disapprobation:24 '
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, dissented
from the Court's holding and reasoning. 202
 The logic of the Court's
analysis, according to Justice Stevens, would permit the States to exer-
cise unbridled power to confiscate vast amounts of property where
professional criminals have engaged in illegal acts."" Neither logic nor
history, Justice Stevens argued, supported the Court's apparent as-
sumption that an owner's complete innocence does not impose a
constitutional impediment to the seizure of his or her property simply
because it provided the locus of a criminal transaction.'"
The dissent first noted that the tenuous connection between the
property forfeited and the illegal act committed distinguished this case
122 Id. (Thomas, J.. concurring).
196 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
197 Berinis, 116 S. O. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
198 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
19"Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
20"Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
261 /d. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
202 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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from the precedents on which the majority relied. 205
 Second, the dis-
sent argued that the forfeiture violated the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution in light of Tina Bennis's complete lack of culpability. 2"
Finally, the dissent argued that the recent decision in Austin compelled
a reversal of the decision reached by the Michigan Supreme Court. 207
First, in an attempt to distinguish Bennis from prior Supreme
Court decisions, the dissent identified three different categories of
property subject to seizure: pure contraband, proceeds of criminal
activity and tools of the criminal's trade. 2" The dissent explained that
the first category, pure contraband, includes items like narcotics or
adulterated food, the mere possession of which constitutes a crime. 209
The second category, enlarged by recent federal statutes, includes not
only stolen property, but also earnings made from various criminal
activities. 2 '"Thc property forfeited in Bennis, the dissent explained, fell
within the third category, which includes tools or instrumentalities that
a wrongdoer has used in commission of a crime. 2 "
Forfeiture in this category proved more problematic to the dissent
because of its potentially broader sweep and because the dissent found
the government's remedial interest in the confiscation less apparent. 212
The dissent argued that early admiralty cases demonstrated that when
the use subjecting the instrumentality to forfeiture is its principal use,
the court may presume that the owner knew of the unlawful use and
may deprive the owner of the property. 213 According to the dissent,
although the cases justify the seizure of a freighter when its entire cargo
consists of smuggled goods, they do not justify confiscation of an ocean
liner just because one of its passengers sinned while on board.214 Ap-
plied to the Bennis facts, the dissent reasoned that the principal use of
205 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2°11 1d. at 1107 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207 13ennit, 116 S. Gt. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). With respect to such items, Justice Stevens reasoned, the
government has an obvious remedial interest in removing such property from private circulation,
however blameless or unknowing their owners are. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2I0 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens explained that the cases arising out of the
seizure of proceeds have not addressed the validity of the innocent owner defense tinder the
Constitution because those federal statutes already include protection for innocent owners. Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The statutory protection given to innocent owners, Justice Stevens
explained, supported the conclusion that elementary notions of fairness require some attention
to the impact of a seizure on the rights of innocent parties. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111
	 at 1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213 Id. at 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the car was not to provide a site for prostitution and, thus, the isolated
misuse did not justify the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property
on the theory that it constituted an instrumentality of the crime. 215
The dissent further commented that, unlike the Court's historical
precedents, the property in this case did not actually facilitate the
offense.21° The leading decisions, Justice Stevens wrote, involved of-
fenses in which transportation was an element of the crime and the
property forfeited actually facilitated the transportation of a controlled
substance. 217 Unlike Calero- Toledo, the dissent noted, the forfeited car
in Bennis did not bear the necessary connection to the offense com-
mitted by Tina Bennis's husband. 218 Although the act occurred in the
car, the dissent reasoned, it could have occurred in any location. 219
Justice Stevens concluded that the nexus in this case between the crime
and the property was insufficient to support the forfeiture. 22°
The dissent went on to reject the argument that the forfeiture
served exclusively remedial, rather than punitive, purposes because it
sought to abate a nuisance. 22 ' The dissent determined that the majority
had conceded that forfeiture itself is in part punishment and that the
state had earlier acknowledged that the forfeiture was a swift and
certain punishment of the voluntary vice consumer, 222
 Furthermore,
the dissent noted that forfeiture may serve remedial ends when re-
moval of certain items (such as a burglar's tools) will prevent repeated
violations of the law (such as housebreaking). 223
 Because the confisca-
tion of the petitioner's car did not disable her husband from using
other venues to commit this offense, the dissent reasoned, the forfei-
ture at issue was punitive and served no remedial purpose. 224
In his second argument, Justice Stevens contended that funda-
mental fairness prohibits the punishment of innocent people. 225 The
215 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
216 1d. at 1005-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1005-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219 1d. at 1006 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22° Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens criticized the tenuous theory advanced by the
Michigan Supreme Court that the car contributed to the neighborhood's ongoing "nuisance
condition." Id. at 1006 n.9. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The theory, Justice Stevens argued, confirmed
the irrelevance of the car's mobility because if the husband had merely continued to drive after
picking up the prostitute, the car would not have been a nuisance at all. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
221 Id. at 1006 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1006 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223 1d. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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dissent criticized the majority for holding that it is a settled rule of law
that owners of property are strictly liable for wrongful uses of their
property, when only three terms prior, in Austin., the Court had held
that all of its forfeiture decisions rested on the notion that the owner
has been negligent in allowing the property to be misused and that the
owner is properly punished for such negligence. 226 The dissent. opined
that the Bennis majority simply ignored Austin's detailed analysis of the
case law without explanation or comment. 227
The dissent determined that the Court has consistently recognized
an exception for truly blameless individuals like Tina Bennis. 228 The
dissent maintained that Catero- lbledo clearly established this excep-
tion.22• The dissent criticized the majority for simply dismissing the
Calero-Toledo standard as "obiter dictum," despite that the Court has
assumed that such a principle existed or expressly reserved the ques-
tion in a line of cases going back nearly two hundred years."" In
support of protecting such blameless individuals, Justice Stevens con-
cluded that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution mandated such
an exception."
Tina Bennis, the dissent reasoned, was as blameless as if a thief,
rather than her husband, had used the car in a criminal episode. 232
The dissent rejected the majority's conclusion that the Michigan Stat-
ute served both a deterrent purpose and a punitive purpose because
deterrence is itself one of the aims of punishment.23" Moreover, the
dissent reasoned that forfeiture could not fairly serve as a deterrent
when a person has taken all reasonable steps to prevent illegal use of
the property:234 In Bennis, the dissent found no reason to think that
the threat of forfeiture would deter an individual like Tina Bennis from
buying a car with her husband if she neither knows nor has reason to
know that he plans to use it wrongfully."' Similarly, the dissent found
the majority's attempt to analogize this forfeiture to the system of tort
226 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227 Bennis, 110 S. Ct. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228 Id. at 1007-08 (Stevens,,]., dissenting).
229 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23D hi. at 1008 (Stevens,,].. dissenting).
231 ./d. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that, in one of the Court's earliest
decisions, Chief Justice Marshall recognized as "unquestionably a correct legal principle" that "a
forfeiture can only be applied to those cases in which the means that are prescribed for the
prevention of the forfeiture may be employed." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting),
232 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
233 Id. at 1008-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting),
234 ld. (Stevens, J., dissenting),
23!" See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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liability for automobile accidents unpersuasive. 236 Tort law, the dissent
noted, is primarily tied to the goals of compensation, while forfeitures
are concededly punitive. 2"
The dissent also rejected the majority's second assertion that the
forfeiture relieves the state of the difficulty of proving collusion or
disproving the lack thereol. 238 The dissent reasoned that whatever
validity the argument might have in another case, it was not applicable
in Bennis.239 The dissent noted that it was perfectly clear that Tina
Bennis did not collude with her husband to carry out the offense. 24°
Because Tina Bennis had done nothing to warrant punishment, the
dissent concluded that the seizure constituted an arbitrary deprivation
of property without due process of law. 2'"
Finally, Justice Stevens noted that the Court's holding could not
be reconciled with Austin:212 His opinion stated that forfeiture of Tina
Bennis's interest constituted a form of excessive punishment. 243 For an
individual who merely let her husband use her car to commute to work,
the dissent reasoned, even a modest penalty is out of all proportion to
her blame-worthiness. 244 The dissent opined that Michigan could have
equally forfeited a brand new luxury sedan under the Court's analysis
because it made the value of the car irrelevant.215 "Dramatic variations"
in the value of conveyances subject to forfeiture actions, the dissent
reasoned, undercut any argument that the latter are reasonably tied to
remedial en dS. 246 The dissent, therefore, concluded that the penalty
imposed by the Michigan Statute violated the Eighth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. 2.17
In sum, Justice Stevens concluded that the Court erred both by
assuming that the power to seize property is virtually unlimited and
by implying that the opinions in Calera- Toledo and Austin were mis-
guided. 248 The dissent stated that Bennis was the appropriate case in
which to pronounce that the Constitution limits the government's
2" Id, at 1009 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1009 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2:3N Id. at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2" Id. (Stevensj., dissenting).
244) 1d. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241 Id, (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242 Bennis, lk 6 S. Ct. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243 M. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241 hi. (Stevens, J., dissenting),
243 M. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241' (Stevens, J., dissenting).
247
 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248 14. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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power to seize property. 2."' Although Justice Stevens declined to draw a
bright line that would separate permissible and impermissible forfei-
tures of the property of innocent owners, he remained convinced that
the blatant unfairness of the I3ennis seizure placed it on the unconsti-
tutional side.25"
Justice Kennedy also dissented in the Dennis decision. 25 ' Justice
Kennedy stated that forfeiture under admiralty law had evolved out of
necessity. 2'2 Although he disagreed with Austin that culpability always
constituted part of the forfeiture rationale, he reasoned that the ne-
cessities that gave rise to and justified the broad forfeiture powers do
not exist in today's forfeiture cases. 253 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy
determined that the Bennis forfeiture did not meet the requirements
of due process because it did not result out of the owner's negligence
or a presumption thereo1. 2"
IV. THE FLAWS IN THE BENNIS DECISION
The right to own private property is central to a free society: 255 The
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that "no per-
son shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without the due
process of law." 2  The Supreme Court has recognized that individual
freedom finds tangible expression in property rights. 257 A fundamental
interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the
personal right to property, for neither could have meaning without the
other:2m When a government possesses uncontrollable power over the
private property of every citizen, all other rights become worthless. 25"
The ability of the government to forfeit the property of wholly inno-
cent owners, like Tina Bennis, strikes at the core of the constitutional
right to own and control property and violates the Due Process Clause
of the Constitution,''"' The Bennis majority held, however, that the
Constitution does not limit the government's power to seize property
2" See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting),
2" Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
251 M, (Kennedy,	 dissenting).
252 BentilS, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
'43 See id. at 1010- 1 1 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
254 Id. (Kenmedy, J., dissenting).
See U.S. Con's'''. amend. V.
256 Id.
257
 United States v. James Daniel Gout]. Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 505 (1993).
258 1.,yuch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
2" Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co, v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897).
2" SPe J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Gram Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921) (indicating
that application of forfeiture statute to owner who did not participate in or have knowledge of
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involved in a crime, no matter how innocent the owner may be. 261
Upon close examination, this decision is fundamentally unfair and
flawed.
The majority's opinion justifying the forfeiture rested primarily on
two propositions: first, the Court has always upheld forfeiture of prop-
erty based solely on its use; and second, forfeiture serves a deterrent
purpose and prevents collusion. 26' Traditionally, the cases rejecting the
innocence of the owner as a common-law defense to forfeiture have
justified the forfeitures on the theory that the property itself is "guilty"
of the offense and that the owner is accountable for the wrongs of
others to whom he or she entrusts the property. 26
 Courts originally
viewed civil forfeiture as an extraordinary power that arose from the
necessities of enforcing admiralty and customs laws. 264
Recently, the Court recognized that the fictions of in rem forfei-
ture were developed primarily to expand the reach of the courts,
particularly in admiralty proceedings, where they might have lacked in
personam jurisdiction over the owners who were often half a world
away and beyond the reach of the law:265
 The impracticality of adjudi-
cating the innocence of the owners justified eliminating their lack of
culpability as a defense.266
 Today's federal and state forfeiture statutes,
however, far exceed the original limited purpose of in rem forfeiture. 267
The necessities that gave rise to the justification for in rem forfeiture
no longer exist. In most cases, courts can easily acquire in personam
jurisdiction over the owners of the property they seek to forfeit:2"s
The majority's interpretation of its precedents, moreover, is com-
pletely at odds with Austin, where the Court pointed out that all of its
precedents upholding the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property
involved a penalty for negligence:2s" In Austin, the Court held that the
in rem forfeiture was subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Constitution because forfeiture rested on the notion that the owner
has been negligent in allowing the misuse of the property and is
illicit use of property seems to violate the foundatiim of due process of law required by the
Constitution).
261 See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 991. 997-98 (1996).
262 Id. at 997-1001.
263 Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2808 (1993).
261 See United States v. Cargo of the Brig Malek Adliel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844).
'65 See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at '2809 11.9,
21,6 Bennis, 116 S. C4 at 1010 (Kennedy, J., dissenting),
267 See, e.g., Mtcit. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3801 (West' 1987 & SuM'. 1995).
2"8 See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996.
269 See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2809.
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properly punished for that negligence."" The Bennis majority, however,
completely and unjustifiably ignored Austin, holding that property
owners are strictly liable for wrongful uses of their property and that
the punishment of truly innocent owners does not violate the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution."'
In addition, the majority opinion in Bennis ignored the limitations
provided by Calero-Toledo by concluding that those limitations were
mere dictum. 272 The majority, however, did not give a valid explanation
as to why Calero-Toledo's proposition—i.e., that the forfeiture of an
innocent owner's property is unduly oppressive and serves no legiti-
mate interest—was misguided. 273 According to the majority, states ap-
parently have an interest in forfeiting property because forfeiture
serves a deterrent purpose and prevents collusion."'
As justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, however, there is
no deterrent value in the forfeiture of Tina Bennis's car."' Tina was
completely reasonable in all of her actions and there is no reason to
think that forfeiture will deter individuals like her from entrusting
their spouse with their car when no reason exists to suspect that the
spouse would use the car illegally. 27" Furthermore, in this case, Tina
clearly did not collude with her husband. 277 The Supreme Court thus
missed the perfect opportunity to hold that the Constitution will not
allow the forfeiture of property of innocent owners when no deterrent
purpose exists because the owner has already taken all reasonable steps
to prevent the illegal use of the property.
In sum, the necessities that gave rise to the personification of
property for purposes of civil forfeiture no longer exist. 27s By allowing
the forfeiture of a truly innocent owner's property, the Michigan Stat-
ute serves no legitimate purpose. The Michigan Statute, therefore,
violates the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by arbitrarily de-
priving innocent owners of their property.
Justice Stevens in his dissent also stated that the Michigan Statute
violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution but was unwilling
to provide a bright line test as to when an owner is sufficiently innocent
27° Id. at 2809-10, 2812.
27 See Bennis-, 116 S. Ct. at 997-98.
272 See id. at 999; Calero-Toludo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. , 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974).
273 See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 909.
274 See id. at 1000.
2" See id. at 1007-08 (Stevens, ,J,, dissenting).
276 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
277 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). ,
278 See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2809 n.9; United States v. Cargo of the Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S.(2
How.) 210, 233 (1844).
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to seek the Constitution's protection. 27" In fact, determining whether
the owner is truly innocent must be approached on a case-by-case
basis. 2"0 The Calero- Toledo Court suggested that the standard should
focus on whether the owner did all that is reasonably expected to
prevent the illegal use of the property. 281 The standard proposed by the
Calera- "Toledo dicta, however, is difficult to apply."' It connotes an affir-
mative duty, whereas innocence of crime and ignorance of potential
wrongdoing are passive conditions. 283 On the other hand, a truly affir-
mative duty to prevent one's property from illegal use might only be
triggered by knowledge or suspicion of potential wrongdoing. 284
A better test would provide that if an owner knows or should have
known of the potential wrongful use of his or her property, the owner
should take some affirmative steps to prevent that use."' An owner's
lack of knowledge of any wrongdoing, however, reduces or eliminates
the owner's duty to prevent the wrongful use. 286 Whether a property
owner knew or should have known of the illicit use of his or her
property would depend upon a variety of factors. 287 Among them one
can include: the relationship between the owner and user, the manner
in which the owner transferred possession of the property to the
wrongfull user, the nature of the property surrendered and the free-
dom of use or scope of permission given. 288
Accordingly, under this knowledge-based test, Tina Bennis had no
knowledge of her husband's illegal use of the car, nor did she have any
reason to suspect her husband's illegal use. 289 Thus, Tina did all that
she could have reasonably done to prevent the illegal use. The Court
therefore should not have sanctioned a forfeiture of her property.
In addition to the Due Process violation, the Michigan Statute
violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 294' Central to the
requirements of the Takings Clause is the notion that private parties
ought not bear costs that should in fairness and justice be borne by
279 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2'State v. 1979 Pontiac Trans Ant, 487 A.2d 722, 729 (N.J. 1985).
281 Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689.
282 United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV, 462 F. Supp. 1383, 1391 (I.V.D. Pa. 1979).
z"=' Id.
285 1979 Pontiac, 487 A.2d at 728.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 ird.
289 See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996.
29() The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that "nor shall private property he
taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Court has held that
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the public.2" 1 If the government chooses to forfeit the Bennis automo-
bile to further the public purpose of law enforcement and "cleaning
up" Detroit, then it must compensate innocent persons who hold an
interest in the property. 2 "2 As an innocent owner, Tina Bennis should
not bear the financial burden of law enforcement activities designed
to address urban problem
The order granting forfeiture directs the government to use the
proceeds to pay the "filing fee of this action," "attorney costs" and "all
police costs" with "any remaining balance to be paid to the general
treasury of the State of Michigan."2" The government can, without
violating the Takings Clause, recover true law enforcement costs con-
nected with a criminal proceeding from a convicted criminal's prop-
erty or from the public generally. 2"5 The government should not be
able, however, to recover its costs of law enforcement by seizing, with-
out compensation, the property of an individual who, like Tina Bennis,
is wholly innocent of the offense that necessitated the law enforcement
costs. 2"6 Although the government might have a legitimate interest in
forfeiting property to prevent certain illegal uses, it should not do so
at the expense of innocent owners. 2" 7 When the government is unable
to or unwilling to compensate an innocent owner adequately for lost
property, it violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amenciment. 2"8
Finally, because Tina Bennis is a truly innocent co-owner, impos-
ing punishment upon her is unduly oppressive, serves no legitimate
purpose and violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment. Under Austin, forfeiture is subject to the Excessive Fines Clause
of the Constitution, which implies that a tine must be proportional
to the wrong committed by a person. 2" In the Bennis scenario, any
amount of fine imposed upon a person who is totally innocent of any
wrongdoing fails the proportionality requirement and is thus excessive.
The Bennis holding departed dramatically From recent Supreme
Court cases curtailing the government's right to take property through
the Takings Clause was made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 114 S, Ct. 2309 (1994).
291 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
292 Brief of the Institute fbr, Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of l'etithater at 21, Bennis
v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
293 Id.
294 Id. at 31.
295 1d. at 31-32.
296 Id, at 32.
297 Saltzburg, supra note 25, at 238.
295 Id.
299 See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
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civil forfeiture law. 30"' The Bennis Court showed indifference to funda-
mental notions of justice and fair play by holding that the Michigan
Statute did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution or
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment."' As Justice Thomas
indicated in his concurring opinion, forfeitures could now be used like
a roulette wheel employed to raise revenue from innocent but hapless
owners whose property was unforseeably misused."2
 The Bennis ruling
puts in jeopardy the rights of all property owners and, more sig-
nificantly, the rights of lenders, lien holders, co-owners and many other
commercial parties because it permits no constitutional protection to
even the most blameless and reasonable owners. The Supreme Court
has held that if a statute does not provide protection to innocent
owners, an owner entrusts his or her property to another at his or her
own peril." 3
 One can only hope that legislatures will show more sym-
pathy to the rights of innocent parties than did the majority of the
United States Supreme Court in Bennis. If they do not, however, Justice
Thomas would remind owners that the Federal Constitution, as inter-
preted by the majority of the Supreme Court, does not protect every-
thing that is intensely undesirable." 4
TALINE FESIEKJIAN
say See id.; Calerv-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689.
3° 1 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996.
"2 1 d . at 1002-03 (Thomas,,., concurring).
303 See id. at 996-98, 1000.
304 See id. at 1001 (Thomas, j., concurring).
